BRSF Index | Steward Index | WebMerchants Index | Search
The preceding article by Barbara Meyer is a forthright statement concerning a predicament in the Buffalo watershed: high levels of fecal coliform in some parts of the river, ADPC&E's moratorium on confined animal permits, and the fact that "there is no information within ADPC&E that indicates that an alteration in current policy is warranted." Ms. Meyer's conclusion is that two years after the imposition of the moratorium, there is no indication that the Buffalo's coliform problems are any less severe. Is the moratorium on confined animal operations going to be a permanent ban? Is it the first step towards a ban on other agricultural uses of the watershed? Many farmers in the watershed fear that this might be the direction in which the state is headed. Whether either outcome would be good public policy is highly debatable, and frequently debated.
The river is the ultimate destination for all effluents from agricultural operations in the watershed. These effluents are dumped into tributaries for free, a classic and predictable "tragedy of the commons." In the language of economics, farmers faced with no pollution charges are given an incentive to "externalize" their costs by passing them on to others.
This is the starting point for the Buffalo River Stewardship Foundation's great experiment, an experiment based on another axiom of elementary economics: you get what you pay for. Agricultural pollution can be mitigated, significantly reduced, or virtually eliminated by use of economic incentives. Environmental economists point out that economic incentives could be used to protect natural resources like the Buffalo in two different ways. First, landowners could be charged a tax for the effluents they discharge into the river. They would no longer be able to use the river as a free-of-charge pollution outlet. Second, conservationists concerned about the river's health could pay landowners to adopt environmentally sound farming practices. Both approaches, theoretically, would lead to a reduction in the amount of farm-related pollution entering the river. The Stewardship Foundation intends to find out whether the second of these strategies can work. Think of it as a free market for the purchase of a clean environment.
We anticipate the usual philosophical objections. By suggesting that we should pay polluters not to pollute, doesn't the Stewardship Foundation imply that polluters have a right to pollute? Perhaps so. Most economists have pointed out for a long time that the most efficient way of dealing with environmental problems is some form of pollution tax that internalizes pollution costs and provides an incentive to reduce pollution. In the language of rights, a pollution tax implies that users of a common property like the Buffalo (say, paddlers and fishermen) have a right to a clean environment. The Stewardship Foundation's premise is that enactment of an effective pollution tax is politically unfeasible and hence highly unlikely, because it would be impossible to enforce and because those subject to the tax would object strongly. Although pollution taxes are economically efficient and philosophically justifiable, they have never played a meaningful role in pollution programs. They are not likely to soon.
Moreover, conservationists should recognize that the language of rights is inherently unstable. To say that polluters have a right to pollute, or that paddlers have a right to a clean river, are both conclusions that beg the question: Why so? The answer is because that's just what the law says. And the law doesn't say it because wise economists and philosophers have arrived at some unassailable justification for allocating rights one way or the other. The law on this issue, as on so many others, is simply the received tradition about the nature of property and private contracts. There is no particular economic or philosophical reason why landowners and not paddlers have the right. But the plain fact is that in our received tradition, the landowners do. Consequently, when ADPC&E places a moratorium on the use of property in the Buffalo watershed, there is a hue and cry about the invasion of property rights. Even most conservationists don't think this is peculiar, because they are inheritors of the received tradition too. In a nutshell, the law says that the right is on the side of the landowner, up to the point where they become a nuisance to their neighbors.
And this is where the Buffalo River Stewardship Foundation hopes you come in. The second usual objection to the notion of using economic markets to improve the environment - a practical one - is that even though it may be a good idea in theory, it won't work in practice because conservationists can't mobilize enough capital to make more than a marginal difference. Obviously, the Stewardship Foundation disagrees. We do understand, however, that to make it work there must be not only a critical mass of willing sellers of environmental goods, but also plenty of potential buyers. In essence, the Stewardship Foundation is a consumer's club. By pooling our dues, and any other funds we can obtain, we hope to purchase a cleaner and healthier Buffalo River. We figure that your dues, thirty five dollars a year, will enable us to make one year's payment on a ten-year easement contract for a little less than one acre, something not insignificant. But like any consumer's club, we will obtain substantial benefits only by aggregating lots of thirty-five dollar contributions into a pool of assets we can effectively utilize. For the Stewardship Foundation to be successful, it will have to raise sufficient funds to purchase enough environmental goods to make a real difference in the watershed.
We believe it's worth a try. Although the philosophical issues are interesting to academicians and meaningful to many environmentalists, the reality is that action always trumps ideals. Conservationists have to make practical choices. They can wait for the state to fix the Buffalo by regulatory command ("Thou shalt not pollute") or fiscal incentive ("Thou shalt pay for it if you do"). For either of those solutions, political reality promises a long wait. In the meantime, let's come together on what could be a practical solution. Paddlers, fishers, and farmers are not enemies natural born. They all want, and depend on, some measure of stewardship of the Buffalo. The way to find out where their interests converge is through the mediating agency of money. The farmers have the legal right. The question is, do the conservationists have the cash? Let the Stewardship Foundation know.
John Harbison teaches law at the National Center for Agricultural Law Research and Information at the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. He is on the Advisory Board of the Stewardship Foundation.